holds profound relevance for all the arts and beyond.

Perhaps most groundbreaking, finally, is Joseph’s understanding of power effects: he shows that art does not merely reflect or anticipate power along a linear historical continuum. At the end of the last chapter, Joseph concludes that The Fletcher “acted as both harbinger and disruptor of this new ‘infrastructure’ of control” (p. 351, emphasis added). The work was simultaneously warning, model, and agitator. As Friedrich Kittler has written, “Media cross one another in time, which is no longer history.”

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Notes


4. In this sense, Joseph seems to respond directly to Hal Foster’s earlier call for an understanding of “the new immanence of art” in Minimalism and Pop in relation with “the new immanence of critical theory (the poststructuralist shift from transcendental causes to immanent effects), but also with the immanence of North American capital in the 1960s.” As Foster writes, “The diagram of these connections is very difficult to produce; certainly it cannot be drawn with the conventional tools of art criticism, semiotic analysis, or social art history alone.” Foster, “The Crux of Minimalism,” The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), 68.

5. The word pieces were subsequently published in the seminal volume Art: An Anthology, designed by George Maciunas. See La Monte Young and Jackson Mac Low, eds., Art: An Anthology of Chance Operations (New York: La Monte Young and Jackson Mac Low, 1963).


JAMES CUNO
Who Owns Antiquity? Museums and the Battle over Our Ancient Heritage


Written by a former director of a distinguished American university art museum who is currently the director of a major municipal art museum, Who Owns Antiquity? will be used and cited by interested communities, largely institutional acquirers, dealers, and private collectors of antiquities in Europe and the United States. That the volume also too often substitutes assertion for argument, idealizing the “Encyclopedic Art Museum,” condemning developing nation-states and what the author calls “Nationalist Retentionist Cultural Property Laws,” while essentializing “Archaeology,” is to be profoundly lamented. Indeed, it sets the legitimate debate on “who owns antiquity / who owns the past” back some twenty-five years, to when the question first began to be asked in just those terms.

The ideal of the Encyclopedic Art Museum (henceforth EAM) is largely modeled on the British Museum, London. Cuno cites a public talk in New York in 2006 by its current director, Neil MacGregor, that articulated the museum’s “cosmopolitan aspirations,” underscoring thereby a mission to achieve world coverage in its collections (p. xxxiv). In fact, much of what is attributed to MacGregor was based on the articulation of his predecessor but-one, David M. Wilson, himself an archaeologist, who outlined the founding goals of the institution as a “universal museum.” Wilson insisted that even today the British Museum stands as a “Museum for all Nations.” This claim is important, since that institution serves as the positive counterpart (pp. 139, 204–5 n. 35) to Cuno’s construct of other, merely “national” institutions, which aim to represent only their own, ideologically constructed histories through careful editing of artistic heritage and artificial assemblages.

A major consequence of the position presented by Cuno is that works reflecting knowledge about human cultures can and should be deposited in institutions that conceive of themselves as offering an encyclopedic, or universal, sample of human artistic achievement (pp. xix, xxxi, and passim). Hence, what the EAM can contain would not be limited by nationalist policies with respect to a purported, and venally constructed, concept of national/cultural identity or property. This position is taken precisely because “the promise of the EAM” is to serve as a “repository of things and knowledge, dedicated to the dissemination of learning” (p. 4), “a force for understanding, tolerance, and the dissipation of ignorance and superstition”; in sum, “a museum dedicated to ideas, not ideologies” (pp. xxxi–xxxii, emphasis added).

It remains unexamined that in the exemplar, the “universal” model institution is in fact called the British Museum, and even Wilson categorized it as among the “national” museums of Britain. Thus, any contradiction inherent in the glissade of having a major national museum with universal aims and purposes escapes investigation. And, therefore, the assertion of the EAM as itself ideologically neutral goes unchallenged, reposing on an ideal rather than a real plane.

Having set out the ideal EAM, the author fails to question the validity of the category in practice. Nowhere does Cuno interrogate how well this ideal is achieved. Yet just as some national policies, it has been maintained, are limiting, so also some institutions that have signed off as supporting the importance and value of “universal/encyclopedic museums” surely do not embody the ideal. The immediate questions that come to mind, which would be ripe for sampling in a properly structured research design, are the realities of practice in selected art museums with encyclopedic aspirations: whether all cultures are indeed represented without value judgment, explicit or implicit; whether objects in stewardship are ever in dreadful shape, not having had the conservation they require, sometimes due to limited resources, other times to neglect; whether institutions do or do not provide, or facilitate, access to visiting scholars; how much redundancy there is in collections (works that could be circulated as long-term loans), and how much of the vast amount of materials owned by the institution remains off display, oftentimes in remote storage. One is forced to wonder whether such museums are in the end not unlike Cuno’s description of Italian institutions, “engorged with antiquities . . . their storerooms . . . long filled to capacity” (p. 128), or whether the “stockpiles of antiquities inaccessible to the public in Italy and China” (p. 15) are any more egregious than those still reposing in their original 1930s Egyptian cigarette boxes or packing cases in New York, Boston, and London, where the ratio of works on exhibition to works in storage can be as low as 2 to 4 percent.

Cuno’s unstated premise is that, unlike the corrupt and ideologically motivated nation-state, the EAM of his projection is neither corruptible nor ideological; works are always properly conserved and preserved; open access to objects is always obtainable; and the art is constantly available to the public for the epiphanic experience of oneness with the human condition (pp. 156ff.). This legendaire in the juxtaposition of the (myth of the) ideal EAM to the purportedly real “Nationalist Retentionist Cultural Property Laws” (henceforth NRCP) means that the EAM is presented in its “best-case scenario,” while the targeted “nationalist retentionist policies” are generalized in terms of their worst-case anecdotes and abuses.

There is not sufficient space to rehearse here the host countries’ perspective on cultural property laws and antiquities; Cuno does it for us, although one notes a certain
It might have been useful to include discussion of some of the more eloquent accounts from the "other side," but this would have weakened the rhetorical power of his position. "Nationalist retentionist" policies propounded by nation-states, and their resultant "nationalist retentionist cultural property laws" are, by Cuno's account, the true target of his polemic. Every case he refers to, from Mexico to Italy and Iraq, from Turkey to China (see chapters 1, 3 and 4), is said to illustrate some aspect of self-interest and untenable property or identity claims (negative constructions abound, as, for example, "Nationalist retentionist cultural property laws like China's . . . ," p. 117).7 In each instance, when citing what he perceives to be "real" abuses in policy or action, Cuno pits them against an "ideal" condition ascribed to the EAM, straw men and straw cases set up as rhetorical foils.

One might anticipate where Cuno stands—not just philosophically but also ethically and practically—on the Native American Grave Protection and Restoration Act (NAGPRA) propounded by the United States' government with respect to archaeological materials discovered within our national borders, given his position on the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention of 1970. Reading between the lines, it would seem that he, as a citizen of an affirmed and globalized world, wishes not only to criticize but also to override laws limiting rights to antiquities. If, by his definition, UNESCO is not viable or has its roots in an impossibly "nationalist retentionist" mindset, while the bilateral treaties the United States government has written with a variety of heritage-rich countries such as Mexico and Mali are equally tainted by wrongheadedness, then is Cuno encouraging his readers to ignore the laws propounded in our own country, as well as those of the host countries, in order to free the EAM to acquire works of art from those places (pp. 24, 43, 66, 174 n. 5)? Regrettably, he offers little in the way of concrete suggestions of how one might work to change the laws, as opposed to offering a blueprint by which one could rationalize contravening them.

The formulaic repetition of the full phrase "nationalist retentionist cultural property laws" becomes an unwary rhetorical device used to sustain the virtuous position of the ideal EAM. "Nationalist" is glued to "retentionist," both negatives to be read as adjectival attributes of "their" cultural property laws, while the first-person plural pronoun "our" is always juxtaposed to a projected universal ancient heritage against the sharing of which "they" conspire (title, p. xxxvi, and passim). Such "nationalist" laws prevent "us" from ownership; "retentionist" evokes, consciously or unconsciously, what we all know from Sigmund Freud is bad: developmentally arrested and psychologically dysfunctional. By contrast, those people Cuno agrees with or cites in support of his positions are blessed with positive attributes, as John Henry Merryman, "the eminent legal scholar" (p. 13).

Of interest is the intersection between the ideal of the EAM and the specific conditions that have given rise to the NRCP. A disclaimer in the preface acknowledges that EAMs are currently predominantly located in the developed world, but this should not be understood as the author's favoring the first world over the third, since the idea of an encyclopedic museum has promise worldwide (pp. xxxiv). Such a position is convenient in that it absolves the author of any hierarchical/Western bias, but the issue of the realization of promise is not developed in the book, precisely because it would have required a look at real EAMs' institutional practices, as distinct from the ideal.

One real (and blatantly counterideal) scenario that can be cited in this regard demonstrates that the reciprocities one would hope for from the comprehensive EAMs have not always been forthcoming. I speak here of the mounting by Stella Kramrisch of the Manifestations of Shiva exhibition at the Philadelphia Museum of Art in the 1980s. The government of India, under the Ministry of Education and Culture, made every possible resource of staff and materials available to Philadelphia to ensure that the finest works of sculpture and painting be included in the exhibition. It was agreed that the Philadelphia Museum of Art would then make "comparable loans" available from its own collection. What the Philadelphia Museum actually offered was to loan back to India representative works of Indian art in its collection. The National Museum in New Delhi, however, already had a rather extensive collection of Indian art; what it desired was European paintings of high quality, particularly Impressionist works, that would provide a stimulating and inspiring experience for an Indian public—just the sort of experience Cuno celebrates as available via works from China, Benin, and Sicily in the galleries of the Chicago Art Institute, or that he benefited from in the Musée du Louvre, Paris, in 1970 (preface and "Conclusions"). According to the Indian government representative involved in the exhibition, the then director of the Philadelphia Museum, an institution that is today one of the signatories to the declaration affirming the "Universal Museum" noted above, deemed such an exchange out of the question. So much for the third world's opportunity to exhibit the global artistic heritage.

In brief, while it is repeatedly stated that national entities should forgo their ill-conceived retentionist cultural property laws so that the whole world can be free to experience our (shared) ancient heritage (as per the book's subtitle, or see chapter 5, especially p. 182), rarely, if ever, is the directional arrow reversed. Cuno does not raise the question of what already established and conveniently self-identified EAMs might do to facilitate sharing as a stimulus to less retentionist policies.

Throughout the book, the "archaeologist" is presented as a member of a monolithic class of individuals ("Often, archaeologists argue . . .").8 As a unifying gesture to the archaeological community, yet another disclaimer is articulated in the preface that "the argument over antiquities is not between us," that is, between museums and archaeologists, "but between us and nation-states" (p. xxxvi, repeated p. 15). We might ask to whom "us" refers in the second instance—to the now-joined museums and archaeologists, or the imperial "us" of the author/EAM? This gesture notwithstanding, archaeologists are regularly allied with the opposition as undermining the mission of the EAM. According to Cuno, "Archaeologists" are regulated by governments with nationalist agendas (p. 52) and so have no recourse but to accept the "nationalist retentionist" position "because they are dependent on nation-states to do their work" (p. 154). "Archaeologists" thus never act for purposes other than their own interest. In consequence, Cuno asserts throughout that "in the . . . debate between museums and archaeologists over the acquisition of antiquities," hard questions are not being asked by the latter (p. 66). That is, self-interest is ascribed to all except the projected ideal EAM.

In fact, a number of archaeologists and art historians, myself among them, have articulated positions that include working with host countries toward the deaccessioning of redundant, nonunique works to responsible public institutions abroad, making long-term loans, reopening the question of the division of excavation materials, and taking on the tough issues related to cooperation from both sides.6

It should also be noted that virtually nowhere is the "art historian" included in either the polemics or the ironies of Cuno's book. A number of scholars/academics, curators even, who actively excavate and would identify themselves as archaeologists, equally identify themselves as art historians teaching and researching in the domain of art history and with advanced degrees from programs of art history. Once noted, that absence cannot be set aside as accidental. To include art historians would have rendered the binary between the good "us" of the EAM and the bad "archaeologist" as instrument of the nation-state less rhetorically powerful, precisely because many art historians would have been on the other side, blurring the boundaries between the absolute categories of right and wrong attitudes.

Cuno asserts that "our archaeological record is being destroyed" through nationalist and sectarian violence (p. 155), while
neither international conventions nor national legislations have stopped the looting of archaeological sites or the illegal trafficking in antiquities" (p. 45). In his insistence that neither the UNESCO Convention nor other attempts to limit theft at sites have been effective, particularly in Iraq (pp. 43, 63–64), Cuno is simply wrong—at least according to John Curtis, keeper of West Asian Antiquities in the British Museum, who, with the blessings of his home institution, has worked since 2003 on matters related to looting in Iraq, and John M. Rassell, special coordinator for Iraqi Cultural Heritage to the United States’ Department of State. Following observance of eight major sites in southern Iraq that had been subject to massive looting in the wake of both the first Gulf War in 1990–91 and the immediate aftermath in the second, Curtis found little evidence for continuing damage. Russell, who flew over more than forty sites in June and July 2008, has the same sense of reduced recent activity. Curtis, Russell, and other archaeological colleagues have credited this directly to a reduction in market activity because of ongoing prohibitions/sanctions/customs policies, both in the United States and abroad. Bilateral agreements with countries such as Cambodia seem to have produced similar results. Throughout, Cuno insists that "Antiquity cannot be owned" (for example, p. 20). Here, he is correct. However, what is clear is that "antiquities" (plural), as objects, can be owned, and in the end, that is what Cuno is talking about. By conflating the historical category of "antiquity," a phase of, or pertaining to, the past, with "antiquities," the objects/marks of the past, he finesse his case for the ownership of antiquities each time he refers to antiquity—particularly since museums, after all, claim ownership of the works they acquire.

A related distinction needs to be made between the terms provenance, used frequently in the book to mean a work's history of ownership before coming to a museum collection (p. 1 and throughout), and provenience, used generally to refer to a work's archaeological findspot, hence, its context. Provenance is crucial for the collecting institution, as it is related to title no less than to the history of ownership—ultimately more of interest to the institution's legal counsel or intellectually to the historiographer than to the historian of the era of production and original consumption. Issues of provenance and provenience frequently arise in scholarly debate with respect to legitimacy and the potential for fruitful study. While director of the art museums at Harvard, Cuno often stressed the fact that context was not everything; important knowledge could be obtained from the unprovenenced work, for example, via technological and stylistic analysis. Yet the objects still do not speak for themselves. Of the six objects from the collections of the Chicago Art Institute foregrounded in the preface to Who Owns Antiquity? all of their explanations require external sources of information, either from text inscribed on or contemporary with the works or through comparison to works with a known historical/archaeological/ethnographic context. It is disingenuous, therefore, to ignore the issue of provenience.

The same sorts of technological and stylistic analyses can be obtained from provenanced and unprovenanced works, the latter occasionally offering examples of types untested from legitimate sources. However, since the illicit traffic of works of art derives from and so stimulates clandestine extraction, unprovenanced works are almost always the product of the destruction of their architectural/archaeological surround, along with any evidence for usage and associated assemblages. Therefore, the unprovenanced work is, by its very nature, the product of a loss of knowledge. It cannot meet the UNESCO goal of understanding the artifact/artwork "in relation to the fullest possible information regarding its origin, history and traditional setting" (cited p. 33). As both an archaeologist and an art historian, I would maintain that it is only by using the fullest possible evidentiary base—that is, provenience plus object analysis—that "Antiquity" can be known through its artifacts. Issues of provenance take us on another path altogether: to questions of ownership history and thus, through antiquities as objects, to collections and collecting. I would further note that many so-called rentivist states are in fact concerned with preserving the integrity of the archaeological site and hence the locus of, and knowledge provided by, provenience.

In the social sciences and history, provenience is well understood as an essential component of the "social life of things"—how works were used and experienced. To the extent that art historians have a stake in the production of history, they, too, not just archaeologists, are engaged with issues of provenience, since the context of function and value, production and consumption are important aspects of the work. For art historians dealing with antiquities, this history can be known only from combining formal/visual/technological analysis with the archaeological and textual record. If one is going to take seriously the Enlightenment enterprise of the cumulation of knowledge (espoused pp. 123–24, 129, 140), then provenience has to be a component of the knowledge that has been set up by Cuno himself as desirable.

The distinction between "provenance" and "provenience" leads one back, then, to "Antiquity" versus "antiquities" and the title of the volume under review. Cuno rejects the claims that archaeological sites and objects should be owned by the state simply because they are found within sovereign territory (pp. 20, 146, and passim). He does not, however, challenge all ownership potential with respect to antiquities. If modern nation-states have no claim on historical objects, then who does? Does the extracted object float on a free international market? And if so, does it go where the money is, thereby privileging privilege? Is this the way to enable third world countries to develop their own EAMs and to ensure the preservation, rather than the destruction, of knowledge? Nowhere does Cuno speak of options such as long-term loans or exchanges, as distinct from rights to ownership, to pave the way for a true sharing of knowledge and artifacts, to the benefit of all.

Although careful to retain a focus on the museum and not the collector, the position taken by Cuno will be comfortable for private collectors. His concentration on the negative aspects of the "nationalist retentionist cultural property laws" offers a license to reject the constraints imposed by nonbinding international conventions and binding bilateral treaties, even when signed off on by the United States. Once the sovereign nation has no claim on its antiquities (see above and the discussion in Cuno, p. 20), and rights to ownership outside of source countries is protected by consuming countries' national property laws, then the same free market that makes unprovenanced (and unprovenenced) works available to public institutions makes them available to the private sphere. In economic terms, the public municipal museums must also buy into that private sphere, as they require funding for acquisitions and installations, often depending on collectors for gifts and patronage. This extended, if unreferenced, audience should not be lost sight of while reading Who Owns Antiquity?

When the author was director of the Harvard University Art Museums, in his position paper "Defining the Mission of the Academic Art Museum," Cuno wrote of the academic art museum as an institution different from the larger community and municipal art museums, noting that the latter "appear confused about their mission." He observed that they often emphasize the marketability of their collections and curatorial initiatives, either by organizing exhibitions so as to maximize attendance and sell merchandise in increasingly large and luxurious museum shops, or through mounting exhibitions not for their real or potential contributions to scholarship but because they can be "sold" to other venues—including, increasingly, far distant ones with greater and greater risk to the safety of their collections. Cuno further noted that "too many art museums are responding frantically to political pressures for increased access, appearing
defensive and reactionary," continuing the following paragraph with: "We, at Harvard, on the other hand . . ."

On the basis of the eulogistic presentation of those self-same municipal art museums in the book under review, one must rejoice that so much of what Cuno observed in 1994 has miraculously changed in the interim. But one could also perhaps suggest that when director of an academic art museum, Cuno set up the large municipal museums as his rhetorical foil, just as now that he is a director of a large municipal museum, he has set up new foils: the contentious nation-state and the compromised archaeologist. In this new guise, university museums have become representatives of a "set of scholarly interests and programs, any one of which might be compromised, suspended, or terminated by a foreign national body," hence, inherently biased (p. 29). Do we see a pattern here?

Although the book is copiously referenced, parts of it seem hastily put together. The preface reads as if originally a public talk, latterly attached and preceding the book's introduction but still retaining the spoken language, as in references to "This object . . ." when the images are consistently on the overlay, not on the projector. Perhaps different timing might have allowed for better integration, as well as correction of some of the more blatant typography, such as "Champillon" for "Champlion" (p. viii-xvi and index) and "Magga for Moggao" (p. 120), along with inconsistencies such as the roots of "nationalism" as we know it set in the nineteenth century in one place (p. 124) and the eighteenth century in another (p. 125). Which historical context pertains is not insignificant for Cuno's chosen opposition of source countries' "nationalism" to the Enlightenment enterprise. In any case, the reader is left wondering just who the audience was/is for this book, given its idealization of the EAM, its criticism of not only the nation-state but of all "Nationalist Retentionist Cultural Property Laws," its essentialization of the class of academics/scholars deemed "archaeologists," and its elimination of the entire class of art historians who work on ancient materials.

It is most unfortunate that the author, while offering a number of prescriptions for what others, such as archaeologists, should be doing (for example, p. 154), has felt no need to propose any concrete program from the perspective of his own professional expertise: just what the so-called EAMs could, or should, be doing from within toward a more equitable sharing of "our ancient heritage." He might better have taken a page from the book of David Wilkin, who, even as he defended the concept of the "universal museum," found a way to address the cooperation that can be fruitful for national museums in less developed countries—solutions ranging from the training of interns in the United Kingdom to offering on-site expertise in host countries and a variety of "joint ventures with foreign institutions," including loans that can go in both directions.15

Nevertheless, the news in general is not bad. Despite resistance by both Cuno and Philippe de Montebello, then director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, the Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD) last year adopted a "New Report on Acquisition of Archaeological Materials and Ancient Art," which distinguishes between historical and recent cases, recognizing "the 1970 UNESCO Convention as providing the . . . threshold date for . . . more rigorous standards" governing "the acquisition of archaeological materials and ancient art."16 The historically less conservative American Association of Museums (AAM), in its most recent statement of July 2008, has issued an equally important set of "Standards Regarding Archaeological Material and Ancient Art."17 A tip ping point thus seems to have been reached on how American museums and most of their directors are currently positioning themselves. The optimistic view is that there is already a cadre of younger museum directors and curators who are acting in keeping with responsible policies regarding antiquities, however they may feel about the ownership of "Antiquity."

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Notes


2. David M. Wilson, The British Museum: Purpose and Politics (London: British Museum Publications, 1980), 106-17 (emphasis added), a source MacGregor would be the first to acknowledge. It should also be noted that of the international community of major art museum directors, MacGregor has been the most active in providing support and resources following the looting of the Iraq Museum in 2003 and in the investigation of the looting of archaeological sites.

3. Ibid., 107.


5. Geraldine Fabriant, "The Good Stuff in the Back Room," New York Times, March 19, 2009. Ironically, it is the current economic downturn that has led many large municipal institutions to bring up works from storage in lieu of expensive blockbuster shows.


7. Cuno recounts that, in 2005, he argued against the Chinese request to the United States' Department of State's Cultural Property Advisory Committee for an agreement to restrict the import of illicitly trafficked Chinese artifacts into the United States, and that the decision was postponed in October 2006 (pp. 92-93, 195 n. 7). The agreement was signed in January 2009.


10. This was stated in conversation and on numerous occasions and is explicitly referenced in the book under review with respect to unprovenanced Mayan ceramics (p. 9), which is in fact not accurate. It is also implied in Cuno's foreword to the exhibition catalog The Fire of Hephaestus: Large Classical Bronzes from North American Collections, ed. Carol C. Mattusch [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Art Museums, 1996], 8-10.

11. Cuno buttresses this position (see p. 24, for example) with reference to the work of Kwanie Anthony Appiah, especially Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers [New York: W. W. Norton, 2006]. His reading is selective, however. It is unfortunate that he was not equally attentive to the piece first offered by Craig Calhoun, "Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Social Imaginary," Daedalus 137, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 105-14, who also cited Appiah, regarding the fashionability of the construct and its attendant baggage. Calhoun argues that "felt cosmopolitanism depends on privilege," a very specific social context in which "our mobility" gives rise to projections of "universality" (106). Understood in this way, Cuno's claims for cosmopolitanism as a standard of behavior become no less ideological than his assessment of claims about nationalism.

12. The frequent elision of historical acquisition claims on museum collections by source countries and claims concerning current repatriation of international accords post-1970 or 1983 plays on the fears of every institution that their ownership of long-held works can and will be challenged (see p. 9). This important distinction has been stressed in a number of publications, including one cited by Cuno.
works gifted from the private sphere. Cuno’s elision has the rhetorical effect of rendering all claims improvable or absurd.

13. With the exception of a lengthy endnote (p. 200 n. 7) regarding the Shelby White-Leon Levy Program for Archaeological Publication and a $200 million gift to New York University for the founding of the Institute for the Study of the Ancient World, collectors are not mentioned.


